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INTRODUCTION
United States climate policy is paralyzed by domestic politics and a
culture of over-consumption. China, despite scientific evidence that its
emissions alone could lead to catastrophic climate events, employs a
climate policy arguably based on a cold (though perhaps correct) reality in
which the climate crisis is inevitable and only the economically strong will
survive. Thus, this Essay has a simple thesis: to date, both the United States
and Chinese governments have failed to show leadership in responding to
the climate crisis, and without such leadership the countries' continued
paths will make the potential crisis a reality.
During the 2009-2010 academic year, I was a J. William Fulbright
Scholar, teaching at Sun Yat-sen University (also known as Zhongshan
University) in Guangzhou, China. Guangzhou sits as the capital of
Guangdong province in south China, a global manufacturing power in the
Pearl River Delta, near the boomtown of Shenzhen, and two hours north of
Hong Kong by train. While there, I taught courses on the U.S. legal system
* Professor of Law in the Environmental Law Center and Faculty Director of the U.S.-China
Partnership for Environmental Law at Vermont Law School; A.B., J.D., The University of Chicago; J.
William Fulbright Scholar, Sun Yat-sen University School of Law, Guangzhou, China (2009-10). I wish
to thank David Mears, Adam Moser, Pat Parenteau, Dan Partan, and Andrea Voyer. All mistakes are my
own.
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and environmental law to Chinese undergraduate and graduate students. I
was fortunate enough to give numerous lectures, participate in roundtables
with Chinese faculty and officials, have discussions with American
academics in China, and build relationships with U.S. government officials.
Nearly all these experiences involved, some exclusively, discussion of
climate change and the political roles and responsibilities of the United
States and China, the two largest emitters of greenhouses gases in the
world.
While I was in China, this quote appeared in the China Daily, China's
English language newspaper: "China 'could not and should not' set an
upper limit on greenhouse gas emissions at the current phase, said Su Wei,
the chief negotiator of China for climate change talks . . . ." Similar views
were expressed by Chinese academics and policy-makers participating in a
"China-U.S. Relations Roundtable" held by the Center for Asia-Pacific
Studies at Sun Yat-sen University in May 2010. The question is whether
China's policy is irresponsible given the scope and pace of Chinese
development and energy consumption (a view held by the Europeans at the
Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009).
The reasons behind China's public stance, and unwillingness to curb
overall emissions, are well-known: China deserves its turn to develop;
China is only a developing country; China wants to be seen as the leader of
the developing world (i.e., the king of the BASIC countries, Brazil, South
Africa, India, and China), not a member of the fully developed world;
China's per capita carbon emissions pale in comparison to the United
States'; China remains a poor country; China's foreign policy is non-
interventionist and does not tell other countries what to do, and China
expects the same autonomy in return; economic stability is key to social
stability and nationalism; absent a strong economy there will be civil unrest
and Communist Party leaders may lose power; and the list goes on.
The Chinese stance, that no cap on carbon emissions will ever exist no
matter how high, may be a product of China's belief in a cold and hard, and
potentially true, reality-that global economic power is paramount and will
provide the only avenue to adapt to an inevitable climate crisis, as well as
achieve the milestones of superpower status, many of which they have
already achieved (e.g., Olympic Games, World Expo, United Nations
Security Council). While China's policy remains problematic, as is United
States' failure to lead in the international community on the issue of climate
change, China's actions, while globally irresponsible, may be very
1. Lan Lan, 'No Intention' of Capping Emissions, CHINADAILY (Feb. 25, 2010, 6:58AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-02/25/content 9499066.htm.
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reasonable if solely defined by Chinese domestic interests. The question is
whether China's dramatic economic rise comes with more responsibility,
and what is the responsibility of the United States in light of its existing and
historical economic prowess and level of energy consumption.
I. THE RISE OF CHINA
The United States and China emit more greenhouse gases than any
other countries in the world.2 Further, China recently surpassed the United
States to become the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world.3 The
two nations will likely remain the top two emitters for some time, given the
strength of their economies and accompanying energy demands, due to the
existence of large coal reserves in both countries that are used to generate
the majority of each nation's energy, and because they are home to the
world's largest auto and oil markets, each country importing more than half
of the oil they consume.4
In addition, the current consumption patterns of the United States, and
the emerging consumption patterns in China, will allow retention of their
two top statuses. While in China, I grew increasingly concerned about both
American and Chinese consumption patterns. The Chinese are adopting the
American model of consumerism and consumption. The American
economy is in large part defined by over-consumption, consumerism, and
commoditization, where social status is defined by material wealth and
goods are meant to be accumulated and thrown out.5 China, pursuing
similar levels of economic prosperity and standards of living, is following
the same path towards larger cars, bigger homes, processed foods, and
disposable goods. The two countries have, in one sense, a reciprocal
arrangement-an economic dependency whereby China pollutes heavily to
manufacture and export relatively inexpensive goods desired by Americans
and other developed nations. Yet, Americans and members of the global
community often criticize Chinese development, pollution, and greenhouse
gas emissions, all factors necessary to increase standards of living in China.
2. Global Greenhouse Gas Data, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/globalghg.html (last updated Mar. 3, 2010).
3. Graphic Detail Gas Exchange: C02 Emissions 1990-2006, 447 NATURE 1038, 1038
(2007).
4. Peter Fairley, China & Coal Future, 110 TECH. REV. 56, 56-57 (2007).
5. JULIET B. SCHOR, WHY Do WE CONSUME So MUCH? 3-6 (2001), available at
http://www.csbsju.edu/Documents/Clemens%/ 20Lecture/lecture/Book01.pdf See also Jason J.
Czarnezki, Everyday Environmentalism: Concerning Consumption, [2011] 41 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
Law Inst.) 10,374, 10,378-79 (2011).
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But with rising standards of living in China, domestic energy
consumption has risen at a far faster than anticipated rate. Wrote the New
York Times:
Even as China has set ambitious goals for itself in clean-
energy production and reduction of global warming gases,
the country's surging demand for power from oil and coal
has led to the largest six-month increase in the tonnage of
human generated greenhouse gases ever by a single
country. China's leaders are so concerned about rising
energy use and declining energy efficiency that the cabinet
held a special meeting . . . to discuss the problem ....
Coal-fired electricity and oil sales each climbed 24 percent
in the first quarter from a year earlier, on the heels of
similar increases in the fourth quarter.6
Like greenhouse gases, the Wall Street Journal has reported that China has
become the world's top energy user, surpassing the United States.' At the
same time, China is reluctant to accept its status as an economic and
polluting powerhouse, for there remains a fear that global power translates
to more global responsibility.'
This leads us to "The China Problem," as described by Professor
Michael Vandenbergh.9 Vandenbergh writes "China's projected emissions
are so large that, when added to the greenhouse gases already in the
atmosphere, Chinese emissions alone may be sufficient to trigger
catastrophic climate change even if all other countries approach near-zero
emissions levels."'0 In other words, China has adopted a policy that
foresees no need to have an emissions cap, even though their current path to
development will lead to potentially catastrophic climate change events
even if all other countries emissions capped emission at zero immediately.
What is especially humbling is that China accepts this, even if it means, for
example, that the economically prosperous Chinese megadeltas, particularly
Guangzhou's Zhujiang delta, Shanghai's Changjiang delta and Tianjin's
6. Keith Bradsher, China h Energy Use Threatens Goals on Warming, N.Y TIMES, May 6,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/business/energy-environment/07energy.html.
7. Spencer Swartz & Shai Oster, China Tops US. in Energy Use, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703720504575376712353150310.html.
8. Shai Oster, We're Not No. 1 (In Energy)!, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2010,
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/07/20/were-not-no-I-in-energy/.
9. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 905
(2008).
10. Id. at 908.
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Huanghe delta, face storm surges and flooding, putting communities,
biodiversity, and infrastructure at risk of being damaged." China also faces
the possibility of major food shortages, serious drought, and mass
migration.12
II. U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS
Despite the grave picture that I have just drawn, the United States and
China have developed many bilateral cooperative agreements to help
mitigate the climate change problem. In November 2009, in advance of the
Copenhagen Climate Conference to be held later that year and while I was
living in China, U.S. President Barack Obama traveled to China. Obama's
trip received mixed reviews at best. Many Americans felt that Obama's
vision for international meetings without requiring any quid pro quo to be a
successful fresh perspective, and the Chinese were honored to have
America's new leader within China, where he enjoys relative popularity.13
However, some felt the Chinese had micromanaged the visit, which
included a university town hall meeting in Shanghai, and that the United
States received little in exchange for the high-profile visit.' 4 Despite these
critiques, President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao released an
optimistic joint statement about the United States-China relationship in
response to the climate crisis.
Obama and Hu agreed that each country would take "significant
mitigation actions" and would strive for a positive outcome at the
11. Cruz et al., Asia, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY
493 (Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-
chapterl0.pdf; see also Sea Level Rising Near Shanghai, PEOPLE'S DAILY, July 5, 2000,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200007/05/eng20000705_44671.html ("A side effect of its
breakneck pace of development, Shanghai is slowly sinking into the sea."); Maren A. Lau, Adaptation to
Sea-level Rise in the People & Republic of China: Assessing the Institutional Dimension of Alternative
Organisational Frameworks (Hamburg Univ., Working Paper) (on file with author) (discussing the
impact of climate change on coastal China).
12. Ed Chen, Climate Induced Migration and Conflict: Historical Evidence, and Likely Future
Outlook, SCI. 2.0 (Sept. 21, 2009, 4:38 PM),
http://www.science20.com/alchemist/blog/climate induced migration-and conflict historical evidence
and likelyfuture outlook.
13. Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Obama Popular in Japan, China and South Korea, PEW RES.
CENTER PUBLICATIONS (Nov. 12, 2009), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1409/obama-asia-trip-popular-
japan-china-south-korea.
14. Helene Cooper, China Holds Firm on Major Issues in Obama h Visit, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 17,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/world/asia/18prexy.html.
15. Joint Press Release, Statement by President Obama and President Hu of China (Nov. 17,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-press-statement-president-obama-
and-president-hu-china.
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Copenhagen conference based on "the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities."' 6 Perhaps not surprisingly, with the United
States and China as two key international actors on climate issues, these
basic principles would provide the basic framework for the non-binding
Copenhagen Accord, although the Copenhagen agreement lacked any legal
force.
The United States and China have also signed a Memorandum of
Understanding "to strengthen and coordinate our respective efforts to
combat global climate change, promote clean and efficient energy, protect
the environment and natural resources, and support environmentally
sustainable and low-carbon economic growth."' 7  The goal of the
memorandum is for both countries to use their joint expertise, resources,
research capacity, and combined market size to accelerate progress towards
mutual goals in a whole host of substantive areas: energy conservation and
energy efficiency; renewable energy; cleaner uses of coal; carbon capture
and storage; sustainable transportation, including electric vehicles;
modernization of the electrical grid; joint research and development of
clean energy technologies; clean air and water; natural resource
conservation; and combating climate change and promoting low-carbon
economic growth.'
In terms of specific joint projects that support these initiatives, the U.S.-
China Clean Energy Research Center is perhaps the furthest along, and
actually has significant financial backing of a hundred million dollars.' 9 The
two key efforts of the center are, first, to create advances in clean vehicle
technology, and, second, to develop advances in "clean coal" technology,
including carbon capture and storage.20 Both of these goals are important
efforts as the United States and China are the largest auto markets and
petroleum markets, and have abundant coal resources. 2' While this
16. Id.
17. Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and
the Environment, U.S.-China, July 28, 2009, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/126802.pdf
18. Id.
19. David Sandalow, The US. and China - Advancing Clean Energy Research Through
Cooperation, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010, 10:55 AM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/03/us-and-china-advancing-clean-energy-research-through-
cooperation.
20. Despite my own admitted skepticism, some have argued that "clean coal" technology is an
available solution. See James Fallows, Dirty Coal, Clean Future, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 2010,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/12/dirty-coal-clean-future/8307/ (discussing that
"for now, the only way to meet the world's energy needs . . . is to use coal," but that new technologies
are making the use of coal cleaner).
21. Id.
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cooperation is an important step, "major issues remain, not least of which is
how to handle intellectual property issues that might arise." 22
III. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
The international community formally recognized the potential dangers
of climate change in 1988, when the World Meteorological Organization
and the United Nations Environment Programme established the IPCC,
whose working groups assess the impacts of climate change. 23 The IPCC's
first report proved to be a catalyst for the 1992 adoption of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), providing a loose
framework and stating nonbinding goals for stabilizing greenhouse gas
concentrations. 24 It soon became apparent that binding targets and
timetables were needed to achieve the UNFCCC's goals, especially once
the framework's reduction goal to 1990 greenhouse gas levels by 2000
became regarded as inadequate. 25 The Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in 1997
and entered into force in 2005 when ratified by Russia, features binding
"quantified emissions limitation and reduction commitments" keyed to
1990 emissions, calling for an average reduction in developed countries of
about five percent below 1990 levels in 2008 through 2012.26 The Protocol
permits lesser-developed countries to use a base period other than 1990, and
approves additional flexible mechanisms, such as emissions trading and the
European Union's "bubble" allowing for emission commitment reallocation
among its member states. 27
The United States participated in the Kyoto conference, sending an
envoy, led by then-Vice President Al Gore. The United States failed to ratify
the treaty after President George W. Bush repudiated the Protocol.2 8 In fact,
even prior to the completion of the Kyoto Protocol, a near unanimous
22. Adam Moser, US-China Clean Energy Cooperation, Or Not?, CHINA ENVTL.
GOVERNANCE (Oct. 23, 2010), http://chinaenvironmentalgovernance.com/2010/10/23/us-china-clean-
energy-cooperation-or-not.
23. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization history.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2011).
24. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849
(1992), entered into force 21 Mar. 1994.
25. Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyotoprotocol/items/2830.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
26. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3,
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
27. Id.
28. Greg Kahn, The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol Under the Bush Administration, 21 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 548, 551 (2003).
2011] 665
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Senate passed a resolution objecting to the United States becoming a
signatory.29 The Senate objected to the Kyoto plan due to differing
standards for developing countries and concerns about harm to the U.S.
economy, including job loss, trade disadvantages, and increased energy and
consumer costs. 3 0 China, along with 187 other nation states, has signed the
Kyoto Protocol, but has different obligations under the treaty than would
the United States. For example, China, like other developing countries, only
agreed to mitigation measures, not quantitative emission reductions.3 '
The IPPC's 2007 report provided the scientific basis for the
Copenhagen Climate Conference in December 2009.32 The Copenhagen
Accord would emerge out of the conference, and is a non-binding document
that sets no legally enforceable emissions limits on countries.33 The Accord
does recognize decision-making "according to science," and creates a U.S.
hundred billion dollar monetary fund to help the transition away from fossil
fuels in developing countries. 34 The document seeks to formally list the
climate change mitigation measures that developing countries commit to,
and the emission reductions commitments by developed countries, by
ensuring that these measures and reductions can be "measured, reported and
verified." 35
The non-binding Accord, its creation arguably preferable to no
agreement at all, was the product of a political soap opera in Copenhagen.
Amazingly, it involved heads of state rather than career diplomats, and was
complete with snubs, secret meetings, accusations, and new centers of
power. For example, at a meeting between the U.S. President and European
presidents and prime ministers, China sent a high level bureaucrat rather
than Premier Wen Jiabao, offending Western countries.3 6 In addition,
apparently the BASIC countries held a secret meeting which, upon learning
of its taking place, caused President Obama (perhaps with Secretary of
29. US. Senate Roll Call Votes 105th Congress -J1st Session, UNITED STATES SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote-cfm.cfm?congress= 105&session= 1
&vote=00205 (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) (stating that S. Res. 98 received 95 YEA votes, 0 NAY votes,
with 5 Not Voting).
30. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).
3 1. John C. Dernbach, Achieving Early and Substantial Greenhouse Gas Reductions Under a
Post-Kyoto Agreement, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 573, 580 (2007-2008).
32. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties
on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009: Addendum, Copenhagen
Accord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord].
33. Id. at 5.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Tobias Rapp et al., How China and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit, SPIEGEL
ONLINE INT'L, May 5, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,692861,00.html.
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State Hillary Clinton) to barge into the meeting unannounced. Ironically,
this meeting led to the drafting of the Copenhagen Accord.
On the evening of December 18, 2009, following a full day
of meetings with various heads of state, President Obama
prepared to leave Copenhagen having made no discernible
inroads into the impasse. Prior to his departure, President
Obama was reportedly scheduled to meet with the Chinese
Premier, Wen Jiabao, only to learn that the Premier was in a
meeting with the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh,
the Brazilian President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and
South African President Jacob Zuma. Unfazed, President
Obama entered the meeting. Less than an hour later,
President Obama and his counter-parts emerged with a
non-binding political accord that eventually became the
centerpiece document of the Copenhagen Conference.37
While events at Copenhagen furthered distrust between the parties on a
number of issues, these issues-sovereignty concerns by China, desired
transparency by United States, and financial resources for the developing
world-ultimately found comprise within the Accord.38
In terms of international politics, Copenhagen illustrated the rise to
power of the world's developing countries, especially China and India, and
the marginalization of Europe. To some, Obama was a leader who salvaged
something out of the conference, and, to others, he was an enabler of
Chinese foot-dragging and a backstabber of European goals.3 9 In any event,
China can simply be perceived as effectively pursuing its domestic
economic agenda or, alternatively, as sabotaging any hopes for a legal
agreement by not agreeing to emissions limitations under any circumstance,
including reductions of eighty percent in the West. To illustrate these views,
37. Cinnamon Carlarne, The Glue that Binds or the Straw that Broke the Camel's Back?
Exploring the Implications of US. Reengagement in Global Climate Change Negotiations, 19 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 113, 142-43 (2010) (citing Philip Sherwell, Barack Obama Denies Accusations that
He 'Crashed' Secret Chinese Climate Change Talks, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 19, 2009, 7:22PM, GMT),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/copenhagen-climate-change-confe/6845952/Barack-Obama-denies-
accusations-that-he-crashed-secret-Chinese-climate-change-talks.html). But see Jake Tapper, High
Drama in Copenhagen (per Administration Officials), ABC NEWS,, Dec. 18, 2009,
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/12/high-drama-in-copenhagen-per-administration-
officials.html (offering a different account of the incident).
38. Carlarne, supra note 37, at 144-46.
39. Id. at 142 (citing Rapp et al., supra note 36) ("President Obama, in turn, is reported to have
taken umbrage at Wen Jiabao's absence and also to have alienated his European colleagues by accepting
the possibility of temporarily abandoning concrete emissions reduction targets and suggesting that
progress could be reached in multilateral settings outside of the UNFCCC.").
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the German news source, Speigel, published an article entitled "How China
and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit," with a third part subtitled
"Obama Stabs the Europeans in the Back."40
Copenhagen also showed that, while the United States is willing to
return to international politics on climate change and to take symbolic
responsibility as one of the largest greenhouse gas emitters in the world,
from a policy standpoint, the United States is unwilling or unable to make
difficult concessions that will ultimately produce an international
agreement. 4 ' The Accord was not formally adopted by the UNFCCC
Conference of Parties.4 2
The experience in 2009 at Copenhagen illustrates the continued lack of
support from the United States, as well as China and India, for legally
binding emissions limits. This lack of support has hindered international
efforts to mitigate greenhouse gases. Reporting of an October 2010 meeting
in Tiajin, China, Agence France-Presse reported:
The world's two biggest greenhouse-gas polluters sparred
throughout the six-day United Nations talks in China,
triggering anger from environmentalists who said countries
were acting in self-interest and not to save the planet ....
[U.S. climate envoy Jonathan] Pershing said the biggest
problem remained the refusal by China and other
developing nations to commit through the U.N. process to
curbing their emissions, and to have those efforts
monitored and verified. "These elements are at the heart of
the deal. And the lack of progress on these gives us concern
about the prospects for Cancun," he said, insisting this was
an element agreed to in Copenhagen. China, on the other
hand, insisted all week that the United States and other rich
nations should do much more to curb their emissions,
highlighting their historic responsibility for the problem.
China's chief climate negotiator, Su Wei, said the United
40. Rapp et al., supra note 36. This is a fascinating article describing why the Copenhagen
Climate Conference failed to produce a binding legal international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. The reasons include Chinese obstructionism, U.S. domestic politics and its own desire for
economic prosperity, the rise of power of developing nations, and the fall of Europe.
41. Carlarne, supra note 37, at 141 ("The President's decision to address the Conference and,
in so doing, to confirm the United States' responsibility as one of the biggest polluters was an important
symbolic gesture. Beyond its symbolic value, however, the speech offered no new advances to the
negotiations. The President's speech marked the return of the United States to the center of high level
climate politics but it failed to break the stalemate. At the start of the last formal day of the Conference,
the delegates remained firmly dead-locked.").
42. Id. at 144.
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States was throwing up smokescreens to hide its own
inaction. "It's not fair to criticize if you are not doing
anything," he said.43
Both the United States and China are hindered by the reality of domestic
politics and their ability to blame the other for lack of progress. Professor
Cinnamon Carlarne, increasing future political pressure, described the 2010
Cancun Climate Change Conference as "a determinative point for both a 2
degree world and the continuing validity of the UNFCCC process," 44 but
COP-16 in Cancun has come and gone with little fanfare. The Cancun
process avoided the high-stakes drama of Copenhagen, successfully set up a
fund for adaptation measures in poor countries, created a mechanism for
technology transfer, approved a deal to protect tropical forests, and ensured
adherence to the goals put forward in the Copenhagen Accord.45
IV. DOMESTIC POLITICS
The United States and Chinese governments have significant domestic
political pressures that limit their ability and desire to come to a progressive
international agreement on climate change, and these pressures create the
type of chaos and self-interested behavior seen at Copenhagen.
China does not want to limit its amazing and historic economic growth
and development. The domestic justifications are sound and
understandable. Economic prosperity defines global power, many Chinese
still need to be brought out of poverty, and economic success provides the
necessary stability for the ruling Communist party to stay in power. As a
result, China is happy to become far more energy efficient, but will make
no emissions limitations promises that have the potential to limit overall
economic growth.
To this end, China has developed "carbon intensity" targets in an effort
to slow its greenhouse gas emissions and become more energy efficient.
China proposes to reduce carbon intensity-the amount of CO2 emitted per
unit of economic output-by forty to forty-five percent, compared with
43. Agence France-Presse, China and US. Blame Each Other as Climate Talks Conclude,
PORTFOLI (Oct. 9, 2010, 7:39PM), http://portfo.li/o/255346-china-and-u-s-blame-each-other-as-climate-
talks-conclude.
44. Carlarne, supra note 37, at 149.
45. John M. Broder, Climate Talks End with Modest Deal on Emissions, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 11,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/science/earth/12climate.html.
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2005.46 Unfortunately, under this plan, even though the rate of emissions
will slow, overall emissions will continue to rise. This will eventually rub
up against "The China Problem"-that even if other countries reduce
emissions to zero, China's growth and emissions alone, despite improving
energy intensity, have the potential to push global temperature above the
two degree Celsius threshold goal, and potentially further. 47
Similar to China, the United States has domestic political and economic
considerations that have created roadblocks for international climate
agreements and domestic initiatives. These roadblocks include concerns
about limiting economic growth, a culture and infrastructure that support
high levels of driving and energy consumption, strong lobbying by energy
and automobile industries against greenhouse gas regulation, dismissal of
climate science, and anti-internationalism among both politicians and
citizens. As a result, the U.S. government has not enacted a single law
explicitly requiring any public or private entity to mitigate its greenhouse
gas impact on the global climate.
The Clean Air Act, originally passed in 1963,48 with major amendments
in 1970,49 1977,o5 and 1990, 5 states that EPA must regulate air pollutants
that "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare," 52
where air pollutants include "substance or matter which is emitted into or
otherwise enters the ambient air." 53 Despite the statute's plain language,
EPA historically waffled on whether the agency had the jurisdiction to
regulate greenhouse gases and, even if it did, whether it was sensible to do
so.54 Finally, litigation forced the U.S. Supreme Court in 2007 to lament the
dangers of climate change, to find with "little trouble" that EPA is
46. Edward Wong & Keith Bradsher, China Joins US. in Pledge ofHard Targets on Emissions,
N.Y TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/27/science/earth/27climate.html.
47. Vandenbergh, supra note 9, at 908 n. 16 ("Estimates suggest that carbon dioxide emissions
should be reduced to only 20%-40% of current levels to avoid doubling of atmospheric concentrations
in order to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change. . . .China, however, currently comprises more
than 20% of global carbon dioxide emissions and is on course to approach 40%. . . . In the absence of
major reductions between now and 2050, China alone may cause global carbon dioxide emissions to
exceed the target 20%-40% of current emissions.").
48. History of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/caa history.html (last updated Nov. 16, 2010).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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authorized to regulate greenhouse gases, and to conclude that EPA had
"refused to comply with this clear statutory command" by not regulating
greenhouse gases if these gases cause or contribute to climate change.
Consequently, in the absence of congressional action on federal climate
change legislation,5 6 EPA moved to assess options to regulate greenhouse
gases under the Clean Air Act, and, in December 2009, made an
"endangerment finding" concluding that carbon dioxide is a criteria air
pollutant subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act." This determination
paved the way for the development of regulatory greenhouse gas emission
standards in the United States. EPA regulation under the Clean Air Act may
actually prove to be more rigorous than new congressional climate
legislation, and EPA has now put in place a regulatory program for
greenhouse gas controls on both mobile and stationary sources (though
these rules are being challenged in the courts)." An article by my colleague,
Professor Teresa Clemmer, suggests that "direct EPA regulation on a sector-
by-sector basis under the Clean Air Act's mobile source and new source
performance standard (NSPS) programs offers hope for achieving
substantial reductions in a timely manner." 59
Given the domestic economic concerns that have thwarted both federal
climate legislation and the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, new domestic
action seems unlikely. This will have the consequence of stopping the
United States from joining legally binding international climate agreements.
Under the Treaty Power of the U.S. Constitution, the President can only
make treaties with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate.60 Thus,
international goals must be consistent with domestic legislation, continually
limited by the U.S. Senate (and the House following the midterm elections
of 2010). On the one hand, U.S. domestic politics impinge international
progress on climate change. On the other, it illustrates that a change in U.S.
55. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007).
56. See Climate Action Congress, THE PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/congress (last visited Apr. 4, 2011) (tracking congressional
legislation); see also Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate
Change Legislative Proposal is "Best"?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 123, 126-29 (2007) (evaluating
federal legislative proposals as of late 2007).
57. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENDANGERMENT AND CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE FINDINGS FOR
GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER SECTION 202(A) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT; FINAL RULE (2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/downloads/FederalRegister-EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-
0171-Dec.15-09.pdf
58. Clean Air Act Permitting for Greenhouse Gasses, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ghgpermitting.html (last updated Mar. 30, 2011).
59. Teresa Clemmer, Staving Off the Climate Crisis: The Sectoral Approach Under the Clean
Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1127 (2010).
60. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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domestic politics and new U.S. leadership on climate change could help
lead to international agreement, and influence China's willingness to
consider a cap on emissions.
CONCLUSION
The politics of climate change continue to be a challenge. Since
Copenhagen, both India and China have sent mixed messages about
whether they support the Accord, with at least one Chinese government
official insisting that future international talks should not be guided by the
Copenhagen Accord. 6' International climate politics must deal with the
rising power of the developing countries, the underdetermined future role of
the United States, and the undetermined responsibility of China.
There is no predicting what will happen. A trade war could emerge,
starting in Europe and the United States, putting a tariff on Chinese goods
manufactured through high emissions production (though the political
means for tariffs will likely be under the guise of domestic economic
protectionism). International trade is a key factor in international climate
negotiations. The United States imports more Chinese exports than any
other country, and China's exports account for nearly a quarter of their total
carbon emissions.6 Thus, any such trade efforts in the United States will
face the political and social challenge of competing American consumer
demands for cheap imports.
In a hopeful future, renewed leadership by the United States could
prompt China to act and recognize the environmental costs of its historical
economic development. Domestically, this would be most effectively done
through aggressive greenhouse gas emissions reductions in the United
States. While congressional action remains unlikely, EPA's regulatory
authority is substantial and would strengthen the United States' hand in
international climate negotiations. Internationally, rather than use China as
an excuse for inaction, the United States could move forward on climate
negotiations without China, in an effort to marginalize them. Will the
United States shift course to become a leader of the international climate
61. Climate Change After Copenhagen; China h Thing About Numbers, THE ECONOMIST, Dec.
30, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/node/15179774 (stating that China and India are
opposed to international emissions monitoring called for under the Copenhagen Accord).
62. Adam Moser, Pragmatism Not Dogmatism: The Inconvenient Need for Border Adjustments
Tariffs Based on What is Known About Climate Change, Trade, and China, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 683
(citing Stephen J. Davis & Ken Caldeira, Consumption-based Accounting of CO2 Emissions, 107 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 5687, 5687, 5688-89 (2010), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2851800/pdf/pnas.200906974.pdf).
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debate, continue to be the largest absent actor like its role in Kyoto, or serve
as an ally and shield to China, and roadblock to European preferences?
Alternatively, a reciprocal possibility exists whereby Chinese leadership
and global action on climate change could embarrass the United States and
compel an American response. These two scenarios are clearly less
preferable alternatives compared to a cooperative agreement leading to
significant emission reductions in both countries.
While predicting the future is not possible, currently the United States
has failed in its leadership to develop international climate change policy.
The Chinese government and Chinese scholars often point this out (as do I).
At the same time, China, in some sense, has not been willing to accept its
role as a global leader. At a roundtable discussion in China that I
participated in with Chinese and American scholars, as well as government
officials, it was clear that, for strategic purposes, China wants to be seen as
the leader of the developing world, but, at least on the environmental front,
does not want to have the same level of responsibility as the developed
world, especially the United States. The problem is that on other accounts,
China deeply desires to be a superpower.6 3 The question is, does China's
dramatic rise come with more responsibility? This concern might be why
my Chinese colleagues and students often downplayed, and even denied,
that China would overtake Japan as the world's second largest economy.
As an aside, I do not want to be unsympathetic to the poor Chinese
citizens who benefit from industrialization. First, the poor in developing
countries should benefit from industrialization. However, technology has so
progressed that industrialization can occur with less environmental harm.
Thus, developed nations have an obligation to provide such countries with
resources to industrialize in a more sustainable way. Hence, for example,
the hundred billion dollar climate fund for green technology proposed in the
Copenhagen Accord, whereby developed countries would provide
developing ones with technology and money to support cleaner
industrialization.64 Second, China has significant problems with
environmental law enforcement resources, and general problems with rule
of law. Many Chinese citizens seek greater environmental protection, but
economic interests far outweigh environmental concerns. To the Chinese
leadership, it is far more important to bring China out of poverty, than to
63. See, for example, China's efforts in the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, 2010 Asian
Games in Guangzhou, World Expo in Shanghai, and membership on the United Nations Security
Council.
64. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 32, at 7.
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protect natural resources and the environment. (A similar claim can be
levied against the United States' economic interests and its politicians.)
China is an interesting and unique case-developing at a never-before-
seen-in-human-history pace, and demanding the status as a national power
(as any country would), but also limiting its global responsibilities based on
the argument that it remains a poor country, by placing economic interests
over enforcement of environmental law, and continually insisting on the
bifurcated approach to global carbon emissions. Should China have its cake
and eat it too, or is it true that with great power comes great responsibility?
For example, the United States will likely be the major player in financing
the climate fund, as it is with United Nations administration costs. I'm torn
when it comes to China, a nation fundamentally different than other
developing countries. Should the resource obligations of the West be less
when it comes to China, given its desired and actual status, or is that simply
a view of those who do not share China's domestic economy-first agenda
and foreign policy preferences?
Again, when I was in China, my Chinese students and colleagues never
wanted to recognize that their country would soon surpass Japan as the
second-largest economy in the world. This inevitability is now a reality.
Culturally, the Chinese are not ones to take credit, and, from an
international relations and foreign policy standpoint, the country is
somewhat weary of their economic status. With such economic prowess, it
is much harder to limit international obligation and responsibility,
especially when those arguments often rest on the lack of economic
prosperity for much of the country. While the vast majority of Chinese are
most certainly poor, the Chinese recognize their growing status in the
world, and the Chinese government will want to continue to be seen as a
global power.
Thus, the time is now for either the United States or China to become a
real global leader on environmental issues. Both nations are economic
superpowers, and the initial failure of one to join the other in a leadership
role may lead the other to act. Now is the time for one nation to lead and
challenge the other. China and the United States are the two largest emitters
of greenhouse emissions, and, ultimately, both must act if the climate crisis
is to be averted.
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